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DEALING WITH CORPORATE MISCONDUCT 
Peter J. Henning* 
“Luck is the residue of design.” Branch Rickey 
The standard method these days to resolve a criminal investigation of a 
corporation, particularly those with publicly traded shares, is a deferred or 
non-prosecution agreement.1 Under such agreements, the company 
generally pays a fine, some of which have been quite hefty, and perhaps 
submit to outside monitoring. Upon announcement of the resolution of the 
case, a company can be expected to issue a contrite public statement 
committing itself to making a greater effort toward future compliance with 
the law.  For particularly severe or high-profile cases, such as when the 
Department of Justice wants to show how tough it is on crime, a guilty 
plea by the organization may be required. Finally, prosecutors may require 
a company to alter its internal governance structure, perhaps by splitting 
the jobs of chief executive and chair of the board of directors or creating 
new reporting lines within the organization.  
One might think this approach to corporate criminality is the product of 
rational decision-making based on a carefully weighing of the benefits of a 
criminal sanction versus the costs imputed to shareholders as a result of the 
penalties and expenses of complying with any edicts for future conduct. 
But that is not the case. Instead, the proliferation of deferred and non-
prosecution agreements, designed to spare a company from a criminal 
conviction along with its collateral consequences, has been largely a 
reaction to the demise of accounting firm Arthur Andersen following its 
conviction for obstruction of justice regarding how it responded to the 
burgeoning accounting scandal at Enron.2 The growth and development of 
deferred and non-prosecution agreements since then has been haphazard, 
with federal and state prosecutors employing a variety of terms in the 
agreements to achieve different goals, from enhancing internal controls 
and strengthening compliance programs to ousting a chief executive. It is 
clear that there is no articulable plan for how corporate violations should 
be punished much beyond avoiding the “Arthur Andersen effect,”3 and 
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 1. See Rachel E. Barkow, The New Policing of Business Crime, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 435, 
439 (2014) (“The Department of Justice (DOJ)—the United States’ chief prosecutor of financial 
crimes—is taking a more active role for itself inside companies, at least for those companies that 
have already demonstrated a propensity for wrongdoing. DOJ increasingly allows companies to 
enter deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) or non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) that allow 
companies to avoid criminal charges if they agree to terms set by prosecutors.”). 
 2. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 698 (2005). The Supreme 
Court’s subsequent reversal of the conviction came far too late to save the firm, which went out of 
business shortly after its conviction. 
 3. See Peter J. Henning, Seeking Guilty Pleas From Corporations While Limiting the 
Fallout, N.Y. TIMES DealBook(May 5, 2014, 1:20 PM), 
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prosecutors have not determined what combination of sanctions and 
rehabilitative programs should be implemented when a corporation 
engages in criminal conduct.  
It is easy to criticize deferred and non-prosecution agreements for 
injecting ill-trained federal prosecutors into corporate boardrooms,4 but 
those critiques have had no real impact on the practices followed by the 
Department of Justice in resolving cases.  Instead, Professor Lawrence A. 
Cunningham offers a way to make these agreements a more effective tool, 
which calls for prosecutors to take a disciplined approach to deciding what 
should be required of a company to resolve a case that is more than just the 
“flavor of the week” approach to the terms. His article, Deferred 
Prosecutions and Corporate Governance: An Integrated Approach to 
Investigation and Reform,5 offers an elegant approach–not a solution–to 
making these agreements an effective tool of law enforcement when the 
government wants to impose corporate governance changes on a 
defendant.  
Professor Cunningham recommends that prosecutors undertake an ex 
ante assessment of a company’s governance profile when it is the target of 
an investigation to determine whether the organization needs to adjust how 
it operates.6 If a measure of organizational restructuring will be required by 
an agreement to resolve the investigation, then the government should 
make clear the rationale for demanding those particular changes. 
Otherwise, we are left with agreements that “can seem like ad hoc ransoms 
or trophies created on the fly by prosecutors seeking to claim victory.”7  
This integrated approach is elegant in the sense that it is concise and 
simple, addressing the reality of how the government will resolve cases 
without dawdling over whether deferred and non-prosecution agreements 
are the best or most efficient means available for redressing corporate 
misconduct or whether civil sanctions work best. It is a flexible approach 
in that it does not offer particular terms that should be imposed as part of 
any settlement, nor does it demand that the government renounce certain 
remedies in the name of protecting directorial or managerial control over 
the enterprise. Instead, the starting point is for prosecutors to determine 
how a company’s culture has developed, and then identify its strengths and 
shortcomings in an effort to redress not only a particular violation but to 
develop a means to prevent future misconduct. The goal is not to impinge 
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 4. See generally, e.g., PROSECUTORS IN THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO 
REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT (Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011) (compiling 
a series of articles to evaluate deferred prosecution agreements in the post-Andersen economy). 
 5. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Deferred Prosecutions and Corporate Governance: An 
Integrated Approach to Investigation and Reform, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2014). 
 6. Id. at 3.  
 7. Id. 
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on prosecutorial discretion,8 a problem that arises with any solution 
seeking to dictate how the Department of Justice ought to resolve a case, 
such as whether a civil settlement would achieve the same goals as a 
criminal case.  
I see two interrelated concerns with Professor Cunningham’s integrated 
approach to resolving cases of corporate misconduct when an agreement 
may require changes in corporate governance. Neither presents an 
argument against what he proposes, but rather potential roadblocks that 
could make implementation more difficult. The first concern arises from 
the proposed ex ante investigation of a company’s governance structure. 
As the article points out, there will be increased costs with this analysis, 
including the need for expert assistance in assessing where changes in 
corporate governance can be made and a second team of prosecutors to 
determine the terms of any settlement that might include such changes.9 
But those costs are not a significant hurdle, as he notes, and the learning 
curve to understanding how a company operates would not be too steep.10 
There is, however, another more problematic issue with conducting this 
type of parallel investigation that could undermine the efficacy of the 
inquiry. There are few limits to what a federal grand jury can obtain, as the 
Supreme Court highlighted in Branzburg v. Hayes when it stated that 
grand jurors have the “right to every man’s evidence.”11 Companies may 
be uneasy or, indeed, alarmed by the prospect of federal prosecutors 
rummaging through their records looking for weaknesses in the 
governance apparatus–perhaps out of fear that the Department of Justice 
will find new violations, but also simply because they do not want 
prosecutors intrusively searching through everything the organization does.  
To better illustrate this point, examine a moment the compliance 
defense sought for corporations when the government is considering a 
charge of violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The argument in 
favor of the defense is that the company should not be held liable if it has 
in place an effective compliance program designed to prevent and detect 
violations involving overseas bribery.12 I pointed out that one potential 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Id. at 49 (“The integrated approach to DPAs is drawn narrowly to minimize infringement 
on prosecutorial discretion.”). 
 9. Id. at 57–58. 
 10. I highly recommend that federal prosecutors familiarize themselves with Professor 
Cunningham’s book for insight into how corporations structure their financial and internal control 
structures. LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNTING, FINANCE AND AUDITING FOR 
LAWYERS (6th ed. 2013). 
 11. 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (“the longstanding principle that ‘the public . . . has a right to 
every man’s evidence,’ except for those persons protected by a constitutional, common-law, or 
statutory privilege is particularly applicable to grand jury proceedings.”) (citation omitted). 
 12. See ANDREW WEISSMANN & ALIXANDRA SMITH, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, INSTITUTE 
FOR LEGAL REFORM, RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT 11 (2010), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resource/restoring-
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downside to this type of protection is that it might “encourag[e] 
prosecutors to scour a company’s records for evidence to undermine the 
claim that its program meets the requirements for being determined an 
‘effective’ one.”13 That same concern may apply if the government seeks 
to review documents and interview executives about how a company is 
governed before it will agree to a deferred or non-prosecution agreement 
because it can be viewed as yet another intrusion by the government. 
Moreover, what limits would be placed on this parallel investigation? 
That leads to a second related concern regarding how Professor 
Cunningham’s approach would be implemented. His analysis requires two 
willing participants in the process, at least to the extent the government 
cannot merely extract information through grand jury subpoenas to 
identify potential internal corporate governance issues. The approach 
seems to rest on the assumption that companies will welcome prosecutors 
inquiring into their governance and respond favorably to proposed terms 
that impose changes based on the ex ante investigation. I wonder whether 
the targets of corporate criminal investigations might prefer the current 
system that merely imposes some additional costs beyond the fines from a 
settlement, such as the appointment of an outside monitor, beefed up 
compliance procedures, restrictions on a line of business, or enhancing 
internal controls over certain types of expenditures. No corporation wants 
to spend more money, but to the extent the company can continue to 
operate as it always has, with little outside interference or oversight, then 
an agreement with the government that does not involve any significant 
governance changes might be preferable over running the risk that the ex 
ante inquiry will turn up even more problems.  
Under the current regime, once the Department of Justice investigation 
is resolved, along with any parallel civil inquiry, there is usually little 
outside interference with the company’s operations going forward. 
Shareholder lawsuits are largely ineffective as a means of policing 
corporate compliance programs, even with the Caremark duty imposed on 
corporate directors.14 Federal prosecutors and regulators move on to the 
next case after reaching a deferred or non-prosecution agreement and a 
civil settlement. Because some companies enter into multiple agreements, 
there is little threat of additional punishment for recidivists.15 Judges sign 
off on the agreements with little additional scrutiny, a position recently 
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Cunningham, supra note 5, at 15 (“The importance of effective compliance programs became more 
central to corporate life after 1996 when the Delaware Court of Chancery in Caremark announced 
clear compliance duties of corporate directors.”). 
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endorsed by the Second Circuit for civil settlements.16 Although one 
criticism of these agreements is that they inject ill-trained prosecutors into 
the corporate boardroom, there appears to be little notable interference 
with how companies operate, apart from the occasional flare-up–like the 
insistence of then-New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer that American 
International Group (AIG) dismiss its chief executive, which led to a 
disastrous outcome for the company and the broader economy, as 
Professor Cunningham well illustrates.17 Even the AIG removal looks like 
an isolated instance, however, as few executives have been removed from 
their position since then at the government’s behest. 
If the government conducts a thorough investigation of corporate 
governance and publicly describes why it has sought the particular terms 
of an agreement, much of that information could be open to outside 
scrutiny: whether it be through Freedom of Information Act requests, 
discovery in shareholder derivative suits, or just leaks to the media, it is 
almost inevitable that some–or perhaps all–of the information gathered in 
the government’s parallel investigation of corporate governance will come 
out. While not necessarily detrimental to a company, especially one that is 
well run, there are many organizations that would prefer to keep their dirty 
laundry in the basement, shielded from outside inquiry. In the end, 
companies may embrace the status quo embodied in deferred and non-
prosecution agreements as they are currently imposed just as much as the 
Department of Justice, which can use them to generate headlines in 
resolving an investigation into organizational misconduct without 
generating any real change in corporate governance. 
These criticisms do not mean that the ex ante investigative approach is 
wrong or misguided. In fact, it is the exact opposite. It would add some 
much needed structure to how prosecutors investigate a company and then 
craft a resolution to address, not only the particular violation, but more 
broadly how the company can be reformed to prevent future misconduct. 
When an agreement seeks to implement real change in corporate 
governance, it should be, to adapt Branch Rickey’s phrase, the result of 
Professor Cunningham’s design rather than just plain luck. 
                                                                                                                 
 16. See S.E.C. v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 752 F.3d 285, 297 (2d Cir. 2014) (“To the 
extent the district court withheld approval of the consent decree on the ground that it believed the 
S.E.C. failed to bring the proper charges against Citigroup, that constituted an abuse of discretion.”). 
 17. Cunningham, supra note 5, at 39–40 (“The governance prescriptions clearly had a causal 
role in AIG’s near destruction.”). 
